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CASES NOTED
DIRECTED VERDICT-THE MULTIPLE DEFENDANT PARADOX
The plaintiffs' automobile was struck in the rear by the vehicle of
one of the defendants. The latter automobile, in turn, had been struck
in the rear by the vehicle of another defendant. At the close of all the
evidence, the plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict in their favor on
the issue of liability was denied, and the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the defendants. On appeal, held, reversed: the evidence was neither
susceptible of a finding that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent,
nor of the possibility of an unavoidable accident. Thus, one of the
defendants had been negligent, and the directed verdict should have been
granted in favor of the plaintiffs. It was for the jury to decide which of
the two defendants, or possibly both, was guilty of the negligent act
which had caused the collision. Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1962).
It is well established in our system of jurisprudence that the jury is
the trier of fact, and the court decides matters of law.' If the facts are
of a nature that only one conclusion can be drawn, then the court can
direct a verdict to be entered in accordance with that conclusion.2
A direction of a verdict is not unconstitutional,8 and if properly exercised,
is not an invasion of the province of the jury.4 A directed verdict has
been equated to a demurrer to the evidence, which tests the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence.' A party moving for a directed verdict admits,
for purposes of the motion, not only the facts adduced, but every conclu-
sion favorable to the non-movant that may be reasonably inferred. Only
then, if the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict, is a directed
1. Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875); Richardson v. City of Boston, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 263 (1856) ; Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794) ; Mescall v. W.T. Grant
Co., 133 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Southern Fruit Distribs. v. Fulmer, 107 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.
1939) ; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 102 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1939); South Florida R.R.
v. Rhoads, 25 Fla. 40, 5 So. 633 (1889). "It may not be amiss . . .to remind you of the
good old rul [sic] that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of
law, it is the province of the court, to decide." Georgia v. Brailsford, supra at 4 (J. Jay, J.).
2. Marion & R. V. Ry. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280 (1926); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Cox.,
145 U.S. 593 (1892); Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108 (1879); Kenney v. Langston, 133
Fla. 6, 182 So. 430 (1938); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Alverson, 95 Fla. 73, 116 So. 30
(1928); Baro v. Wilson, 134 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
3. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
4. C. B. Rogers Co. v. Meinhardt, 37 Fla. 480, 19 So. 878 (1896): "We do not see that
this new statutory feature [directed verdict] has in any way curtailed, or attempted to
curtail, the province of the jury . .. ."
5. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90 (1930); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364 (1913); Mackey v. Thompson, 153 Fla. 210, 14 So.2d 571 (1943); Powell v. Jack-
son Grain Co., 134 Fla. 596, 184 So. 492 (1938); Duval Laundry Co. v. Reif, 130 Fla. 276,
177 So. 726 (1937) ; Berger v. Mabry, 113 Fla. 31, 151 So. 302 (1933).
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verdict proper.6 If the inferences reasonably justify a verdict for the
non-movant, a directed verdict for the moving party is improper.7
Direction of a verdict should be cautiously exercised,8 and never utilized
unless "the evidence is such that under no view which the jury might
lawfully take of the evidence favorable to the adverse party could a
verdict for the adverse party be sustained."9 Thus, it generally has been
held that a plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict where there is
some evidence in support of a defendant's defense.'"
If there is no evidence on a particular issue, the court can with-
draw that issue from the jury's consideration and decide upon it as a
matter of law." This can be accomplished by directing a verdict on that
issue12 or by peremptory instruction. 8 If the issue is that of negligence
or contributory negligence, it should usually be submitted to the jury; 4
and if joint tortfeasors are involved, the jury can render a verdict in
favor of some defendants and against others.'" Consequently, if the
evidence is sufficiently conclusive against some tortfeasors, a verdict may
be directed against them, and consideration of the liability of the others
6. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931) (the court must resolve all
conflicts in the evidence against the movant); Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 150 U.S. 349
(1893) (dictum) ; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Eggenschwiler v. Midwestern Motor Lodge Corp., 286 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1961); General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., v. Schero, 160 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1947) (applying Florida law) ;
Cutchins v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 101 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1958) ; Katz v. Bear, 52 So.2d 903
(Fla. 1951); Burkett v. Belk-Lindsey Co., 137 So.2d 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Budgen v.
Brady, 103 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958) (quoted in instant case).
7. Belden v. Lynch, 126 So.2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Henderson v. Tarver, 123
So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); Russell v. Jacksonville Gas Corp., 117 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1960).
8. Hartnett v. Fowler, 94 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1957); Davis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
of United States, 149 Fla. 678, 6 So.2d 842 (1942); Burkett v. Belk-Lindsey Co., 137 So.2d
266 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) ; Belden v. Lynch, 126 So.2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
9. Katz v. Bear, 52 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1951), as quoted in Robbins v. Grace, 103
So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958) (direction of verdict held to be error in both Katz and
Robbins cases).
10. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McCarthy, 33 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1929) (both parties
moved for an instructed verdict) ; Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich. 466,
154 N.W. 575 (1915); Vincent v. Raffety, 344 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1961); Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 SE. 308 (1927).
11. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (no formal
withdrawal required); Writ v. Fraser, 158 Fla. 777, 30 So.2d 174 (1947); Farrington v.
Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So.2d 158 (1944).
12. Goodrich v. Lawrence, 138 Fla. 287, 189 So. 233 (1939); Houlihan v. McCall, 197
Md. 130, 78 A.2d 661 (1951) ; Smith v. Armstrong, 121 Mont. 377, 198 P.2d 795 (1948).
13. O'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384 (1949); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Garwood, 167 F.2d 848, 857-58 (8th Cir. 1948) (reversal for failure to give peremptory in-
struction to the effect that no evidence of negligence existed) ; Zorn v. Britton, 112 Fla. 583,
150 So. 801 (1933) (reversal for failure to instruct to the effect that certain allegations were
immaterial).
14. See cases collected in 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 344, n.1 (1941).
15. Atlantic & Pac. R.R. v. Laird, 164 U.S. 393 (1896); James v. Evans, 149 Fed. 136
(3d Cir. 1906) (by implication); Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc. v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12
So.2d 465 (1943).
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may be submitted to the jury.' 6 Logically, a verdict cannot be directed
for the plaintiff against all defendants if the evidence is sufficient in favor
of any defendant.' Thus, in Murphy v. McAdory 8 an affirmative charge
against two defendants was properly refused on the ground that the evi-
dence was insufficient to justify the charge against one of them.
In the instant case, the court remanded the cause and ordered the
lower court to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability.
The court reasoned that negligence did exist, but that since it was un-
certain who was negligent, the jury must render a decision against either
defendant, or possibly both. The rationale of the court was as follows:
The jury could not have lawfully concluded that plaintiffs'
negligence, if any, contributed to or was the proximate cause
of the collision. The only function which the jury could have
properly performed under the evidence in this record was to
determine whether Allred or Lee, or both, were guilty of the
negligent act which proximately caused the collision out of
which plaintiffs' damages arose. We reach this conclusion based
upon an analysis of the evidence which affirmatively establishes
that the collision in question resulted exclusively from an act
of negligence committed either by Allred or Lee, or both. The
evidence is not susceptible of the conclusion that the collision
did or could have been the result of unavoidable accident. 9
In effect, the court said that the accident could have been attributed
to one of three factors: (1) contributory negligence; (2) unavoidable
accident; or (3) the negligence of one or both defendants. If the first
two factors were found not to exist, it was reasoned, the element of
negligence remained as the only cause. The court refused to direct a
verdict against either defendant, tacitly admitting that the evidence was
sufficient to exonerate either from responsibility for the purported neg-
ligent act. In addition, the court seemed to recognize that a direction
of verdict for the plaintiffs against both defendants would have been
erroneous; to do so would have meant a finding that both were negligent
16. Supra notes 2 through 6 and accompanying text. If the court finds that the evidence
cannot justify a conclusion in favor of a particular defendant, it may rule on that evidence
as a matter of law.
17. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 257(h) (1955). A directed verdict for the plaintiff against all
defendants would necessitate the implication that none of the defendants had any legally
sufficient evidence in his favor. See generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 803 (1954).
18. 183 Ala. 209, 62 So. 706 (1913). In Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 368 Pa. 507, 84
A.2d 200 (1951) the court ruled that an instruction that the jury must find against one or
more defendants was grounds for a new trial as to all defendants. The trial court's in-
struction, 368 Pa. at 514, 84 A.2d at 203, was as follows:
The passenger was injured. He is entitled to a recovery at your hands . . . . There
is no contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. He is entitled to a verdict
... I say to you in this case someone was negligent--either the Railroad or this
truck driver and the Lavatto Brothers was negligent, or all of them . . . were negli-
gent . . . . There is no evidence in this case from which you can say the plaintiff
• . . is not not entitled to a verdict at your hands. (Emphasis supplied by court.)
19. Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760, 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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as a matter of law, when in fact either defendant could have been justi-
fiably exculpated by the jury.2" However, if the evidence was sufficient
to exonerate either, how can it be said that it was insufficient to exonerate
both?2' As the dissenting opinion pointed out:
Viewing the favorable verdict and judgment from the position
of either defendant . . . such verdict and judgment would be
unassailable. . . . [I] f defendant Lee or defendant Allred had
been sued separately and the same facts developed as in this
case, each would have been entitled to the benefit of a verdict
and judgment in his favor, but having been jointly sued, at
least one is deprived of that benefit.22
The reconciliation of this paradox stems from the principle that neg-
ligence does not exist in the abstract.3 Lack of contributory negligence
raises no presumption of a defendant's negligence,2 4 nor does the mere
occurrence of an accident establish the negligence of any particular
person.2 Negligence on the part of a defendant is never presumed, but
is a matter requiring affirmative proof.26 The burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff to show negligence on a defendant's part.2 The definition
of negligence as the absence of certain circumstances, namely contribu-
tory negligence and unavoidable accident, produces the anomalous result
that negligence on a defendant's part no longer need be affirmatively
20. Id. at 764: "The court could not, however, properly direct the verdict against
either or both of the defendants under the evidence revealed by this record." The court
reasoned that the jury could properly find that the negligence of either was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision, thereby precluding the other from liability, or the jury could
find that the negligence of both was the proximate cause.
21. The evidence was sufficient to exonerate either when tried separately. When both
defendants are tried together in the same action, their negligence must still be considered on
an individual basis, so the same result should obtain.
22. Sheehan v. Alired, 146 So.2d 760, 767 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962). See note 29 infra
and accompanying text.
23. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1 (1950).
24. Atkinson v. Coskey, 354 Pa. 297, 47 A.2d 156 (1946); Gardner v. Seymour, 27
Wash. 2d 802, 180 P.2d 564 (1947); Zurfluh v. Lewis County, 199 Wash. 378, 91 P.2d 1002
(1939) ; Twedt v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 121 Wash. 562, 210 Pac. 20 (1922).
25. Interstate Circuit, Inc.. v. Le Normand, 100 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1938); Ward v.
Everett, 148 Fla. 173, 3 So.2d 879 (1941) (fact of injury is not the test for negligence);
Wood v. Jones, 109 So.2d 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); Stolmaker v. Bowerman, 100 So.2d
659 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958). "The mere occurrence of an accident is not enough to establish the
negligence of anyone." Wood v. Jones, supra at 775.
26. "That such negligence is an affirmative fact which must be shown by him who
alleges it must be conceded." Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. v. McClanahan, 173 F.2d 833, 837
(5th Cir. 1949); Roth v. Dade County, 71 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1954) (negligence cannot be
presumed, but must be proved); West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951);
DeSalvo v. Curry, 160 Fla. 7, 33 So.2d 215 (1948).
27. In Heps v. Burdine's, Inc., 69 So.2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1954) the court stated: "The
person injured must point out and bring his action against the one who has caused the
injury." Florida Motor Transp. Co. v. Hillman, 87 Fla. 512, 101 So. 31 (1924) (burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show negligence on the defendant's part). "Where the facts pre-
sented are such that it is apparent to reasonable men that there has been negligence, it is
still necessary for the facts to point to the defendant as the probable creator of the dangerous
situation." Wagner v. Associated Shower Door Co., 99 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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proved. Negligence no longer is a description of a defendant's conduct
in a given set of circumstances, but is rather something which "exists"
when a mishap has occurred and when the possibilities of both contribu-
tory negligence and unavoidable accident have been eliminated.
The writer maintains that the court erred in its implicit decision
that negligence existed because of a lack of contributory negligence and
unavoidable accident. But are there not other possible solutions? For
instance, the jury could logically have found that either defendant's neg-
ligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision, thus absolving the
other defendant from liability. The court's unwillingness to direct a
verdict against either defendant shows that it considered this to be at
least one possibility.2" However, by directing a verdict for the plaintiffs
on the issue of liability, the court, in effect, ruled on the issue of prox-
imate cause as a matter of law, resulting from its implicit holding that
one, but not both defendants, may avail himself of that defense. By
the use of this technique the court may well be ruling against the de-
fendant who is considered last by the jury. If the jury finds for the first
defendant, the court has, in effect, directed a verdict against the second
even though it has admitted that the evidence was sufficient for a jury
to find in his favor.29
The plight of multiple defendants is obvious in this situation: Each
patiently waits for the plaintiff to bring forth proof that he was neg-
ligent so that he may properly rebut it. Instead, the plaintiff merely
exonerates himself from contributory negligence and proves that un-
avoidable accident is inapplicable. Faced with an impending directed
verdict for the plaintiff, the cautious defendant must then go forward
with the burden of proof to show that he was not negligent.80 The court
28. Under one view of the evidence which the jury might properly have taken
it could have found the defendant Lee was guilty of an act of negligence which
proximately caused the collision, in which event a verdict against Lee and in favor
of defendant Allred would have been justified. Under another view which the jury
may have taken of the evidence, it could have found that it was Allred's negligence
which proximately caused the collision, in which event the verdict could have been
against him and in favor of Lee. Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760, 764 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1962).
29. The majority opinion stated that if a verdict were not directed in the plaintiffs'
favor on the issue of negligence, he would be deprived of a fair trial. However, in effect,
this directed verdict deprives the defendants of their right to trial by jury. This conclusion
obtains from the fact that the jury must return a verdict against at least one of the defend-
ants, even though the court admitted that a jury verdict exonerating that particular de-
fendant would be unassailable. In effect, the court has ruled against this undesignated de-
fendant as a matter of law.
30. This shifting of the burden of proof has been seen previously in Florida to a
limited extent. The courts held in the following cases that violation of a traffic law was
prima facie evidence of negligence (but not a presumption): Gudath v. Culp Lumber Co.,
81 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1955) ; Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1954) ; Allen v. Hooper, 126
Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1936) (specific rejection of doctrine of "negligence per se") ; Morrison
v. C. J. Jones Lumber Co., 126 So.2d 895 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Alessi v. Farkas, 118 So.2d
658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). In each instance it was held that the prima facie evidence of
negligence could be overcome by other facts and circumstances, and in each case the ques-
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chose to rely upon this propounded theory of "negligence in the air" with
the novel result that it has now created a "reverse interpleader." Thus,
a plaintiff who is injured joins all parties who are possibly responsible.
Then, after he frees himself from fault and removes the possibility of
unavoidable accident, the parties must battle among themselves as to
who is not liable. This writer feels that this procedural "plaintiff's
holiday" is repugnant to the entire concept of directed verdict and may,
in turn, effect a change in the substantive law of negligence heretofore
unrecognized in our system of jurisprudence.
THEODORE KLEIN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANT'S LIABILITY FOR
INCREASED RENT DEMANDED AS A CONDITION
OF HOLDING OVER
The plaintiff sold a 320-acre tract to the defendant, taking back a
purchase money mortgage. The plaintiff continued to dwell on the pro-
perty without objection by the defendant. Subsequently, the parties exe-
cuted a written lease for a fixed term at a rental of one dollar. The
plaintiff held over when the lease expired, and the defendant served
written notice that if the plaintiff did not vacate at once, he would be
charged rent at the rate of 300 dollars per month for as long as he con-
tinued to occupy the premises. The plaintiff remained silent as to the
notice and one year later, notice was again served on him quoting the
same terms. When the defendant defaulted on a mortgage installment,
the plaintiff sued to foreclose. The defendant counterclaimed for rent at
the rate of 300 dollars per month, electing to treat the plaintiff as a tenant
rather than as a trespasser and choosing not to hold the plaintiff under
Florida's double rent statute.' The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
on the grounds that the rented premises were not worth 300 dollars
per month. On appeal, held, reversed: when a landlord demands of the
tenant different rent for continued possession of property after the ex-
piration of a lease, and the tenant thereafter continues in possession
without protest, he impliedly agrees to pay the rent demanded. David
Properties, Inc. v. Selk, 151 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).2
tion of negligence was ultimately left for the jury to decide. However, the Sheehan court
did not avail itself of this theory. Even had it done so, it does not appear that the situa-
tion in the instant case would have been materially altered. The court admitted the fact of
the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to either defendant which would have justified sub-
mission of the question of negligence to the jury.
1. FLA. STAT. § 83.06 (1961). This section provides that "when any tenant shall refuse
to give up possession of the premises at the end of his lease, the landlord or his agent,
attorney or legal representatives, may demand of such tenant double the monthly rent,
and may recover the same at the expiration of every month, or in the manner pointed out
hereinafter."
2. In the lower court the chancellor pointed out that the building was no more than
1.9631
